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INSIDE THE BOARDROOM: 
EXPLORING BOARD MEMBER INTERACTIONS 
 
Purpose: This study aims to open-up the black box of the boardroom by directly observing 
directors’ interactions during meetings to better understand board processes. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: We analyse videotaped observations of board meetings at 
two Australian companies to develop insights into what directors do in meetings and how 
they participate in decision-making processes. The direct observations are triangulated with 
semi-structured interviews, mini-surveys and document reviews.  
 
Findings: Our analyses lead to two key findings: (i) while board meetings appear similar at a 
surface-level, boardroom interactions vary significantly at a deeper level (i.e. board members 
participate differently during different stages of discussions) and (ii) factors at multiple levels 
of analysis explain differences in interaction patterns, revealing the complex and nested nature 
of boardroom discussions.  
 
Research implications: By documenting significant intra- and inter-board meeting differences 
our study (i) challenges the widespread notion of board meetings as rather homogeneous and 
monolithic, (ii) points towards agenda items as a new unit of analysis (iii) highlights the need 
for more multi-level analyses in a board setting. 
 
Practical implications:  While policy makers have been largely occupied with the “right” 
board composition, our findings suggest that decision outcomes or roles’ execution could be 
potentially affected by interactions at a board level. Differences in board meeting styles might 
explain prior ambiguous board structure-performance results, enhancing the need for greater 
normative consideration of how boards do their work. 
 
Originality/value: Our study complements existing research on boardroom dynamics and 
provides a systematic account of director interactions during board meetings. 
 
Key words: board of directors, board meetings, boardroom dynamics, board observations. 
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“Our Board satisfies all requirements of Cadbury, Greenbury 
and Hampel, but our board meetings are a complete waste of time” 
(Carter and Lorsch (2004:15) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The director quoted in Carter and Lorsch (2004) reflects a major criticism of the current 
status of board research: a concentration on research and advice that is more linked to a tick-
the-box mentality than creating value for the corporation (Huse, 2007). Despite decades of 
research, scholars struggle to understand how directors contribute to organizational success 
(Hambrick et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Yet, most governance 
research continues to use surface-level approaches to infer increasingly complex relationships 
between the usual demographics and firm performance (Daily et al., 2003; Soobaroyen and 
Mahadeo, 2012). Similarly, regulators’ agendas have remained focused on board structures as 
means to improve board role execution (i.e. by discouraging CEO-chair duality, increasing 
the outsider ratio, and establishing board monitoring committees). 
 Many scholars are now departing from these “input-output” models and are arguing 
for an opening up of the black box of boards of directors (Daily et al., 2003; Pugliese et al., 
2009; Van Ees et al., 2009). This has required the application of new approaches, theories 
and techniques as research begins documenting what happens inside and outside the board-
room, often by collecting primary data through direct observations, interviews and surveys 
(e.g. Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008; Huse, 2007; Huse and Zattoni, 2008; Machold et al., 
2011; Machold and Farquhar, 2013). These studies enrich our knowledge about boardroom 
realities (Van Ees et al., 2009) and particularly claim that board performance is not the result 
of board structures alone, but also of director behaviours and group processes in and around 
the boardroom. 
 Despite this growing awareness of the importance of board behaviour, surprisingly 
little is known about board meetings (Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Charan, 2005; He and Huang, 
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2011). This is remarkable as the board meeting is the main arena in which directors discharge 
their duties and responsibilities, execute their roles and contribute to decision-making 
(Lawler and Finegold, 2006). The limited research on board meetings most often portrays 
them as rather homogeneous and monolithic (Monks and Minow, 2008; Tricker, 2009). Yet 
general group research suggests that effective decision-making necessitates different 
interaction patterns for different types of decisions (Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011; Nijstad, 
2009). If this applies to boards, then it suggests that boards may alter how they discuss every 
agenda item, and the resulting pattern of interaction may be a predictor of superior decision-
making (e.g. see Simons et al., 1999; Woolley et al., 2010).Therefore, it is unsurprising to see 
calls for further research into the relationships between the individual and group, the use of 
multi-level approaches and different units of analysis to better understand how boards of 
directors actually work (Dalton and Dalton, 2011). 
 This paper contributes to the existing body of board research by providing accounts of 
what happens during board meetings. As one of only a handful of systematic observation-
based boardroom investigations (e.g. Currall et al., 1999; Samra-Fredericks, 2000a; 2000b), 
we aim to increase the understanding of how boards work by outlining the characteristics of 
board meetings and exploring directors’ interactions during discussions of agenda items. This 
study is based on a detailed analysis of a series of video recorded observations of six board 
meetings of two Australian companies that operate in the same industry. By studying the 
video recordings in combination with field notes, board minutes, interviews and mini-
surveys, we were able to examine board interactions as they happen in meetings. In doing so, 
we focused on multiple levels of analysis (Simsek et al., 2005) and started to explore a 
relatively new unit of analysis: agenda items (Lawler et al., 2002). 
 Our study of board meetings provides two contributions to the study of boards and the 
corporate governance research agenda. First, we find that while board meetings might look 
similar at a surface level, a rigorous review of interaction patterns demonstrates that board 
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decision-making is neither linear nor standardized. Instead, the two observed boards altered 
their behaviour and interaction patterns during meetings, i.e., different directors participated 
in different ways during different stages of agenda item discussions. By questioning the notion 
of meetings as similar and monolithic, we challenge the current treatment of board meetings 
in the literature and highlight that the research agenda would benefit from different approaches 
if we are to better understand how boards make (critical) decisions. 
 Second, next to these intra-board differences, our observations also revealed important 
differences in interaction patterns between both boards. While perhaps unsurprising, this 
finding highlights the complex and nested nature of boardroom interactions. Particularly, our 
qualitative assessment of drivers of interaction differences suggested that factors at the 
agenda item-level, meeting-level, director-level, board-level and organizational-level may 
together explain boardroom interactions. As such, our study highlights the potential of and 
need for more multi-level analysis while studying boards of directors (see also Aguinis et al., 
2011; Cronin et al., 2011; Dalton and Dalton, 2011). 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We commence with a review of 
prior studies that peered into the black box of boards, particularly focusing on studies of 
board interactions. Next, we provide an overview of the two participating boards and the data 
gathering process before presenting the empirical results, focusing on the contributions of 
individual directors and group dynamics per agenda item. We conclude with a discussion of 
our findings and their implications for corporate governance scholars and practitioners. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the last four decades, boards have attracted increasing attention from scholars and 
practitioners. Corporate governance scholars highlight the role boards of directors might play 
as monitors of CEOs (Adams et al., 2010), while strategic management scholars point to the 
value boards might add as part of a corporation’s upper echelon (Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
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However, despite nearly 20 years of calls for additional research (Pettigrew, 1992; Dalton 
and Dalton, 2011), the important question “how do boards work?” is still largely unanswered 
(Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). The literature provides two different but related explanations for 
this ongoing gap in the field. First, governance research has traditionally been influenced by 
agency theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Pugliese et al., 2009) and a consequent focus on board 
independence and leadership (i.e. outsider ratio and CEO duality). Second, obtaining access 
to boardrooms has remained an ongoing challenge for scholars and practitioners over the 
years (Leblanc and Gilles, 2005), resulting in an (over)reliance on secondary data about 
structural and compositional dimensions of boards (Judge, 2011). 
 A growing number of scholars are moving beyond this dominant logic and devoting 
more attention to the processes, behaviours and contexts affecting boards’ activities 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). Studies of board processes and 
dynamics use a different paradigm to unveil what boards do and pay more attention to the 
inner interactions occurring at a board level (Hendry et al., 2010). The main focus here is not 
on structural dimensions of board composition, but on how boards fulfil their tasks and what 
processes are likely to shape board dynamics (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Studies in this 
tradition observe actions and interactions of the board and claim that board outcomes are not 
only the result of a board’s structure, but also of continuous and ongoing interactions inside 
and outside boardroom (Maitlis, 2004). 
  In particular, two streams of research have advanced our knowledge in this area by 
linking processes and behaviour to board outcomes. A first group of studies has directed 
attention towards the intermediate steps between board structure and firm performance, by 
examining board task performance (Huse, 2007). Using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods, they investigate the impact of board attributes (such as conflict, effort norms, 
critical debate, human and social capital) on an ability to deliver board tasks (e.g. Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson and Newton, 2010). The contexts covered in these studies 
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ranges from SMEs to large listed companies in the US (Stevenson and Radin, 2009), Norway 
(Machold et al., 2011), Italy (Minichilli et al., 2009) and Singapore (Wan and Ong, 2005). 
While the empirical results of these studies have not always been consistent, as a group they 
highlight the value of including behavioural and cognitive variables next to structural 
indicators to understand how boards deliver and fulfil their duties (Van Ees et al., 2009). 
 A second group of studies has opened the black box by investigating how directors 
behave, mostly through qualitative methods such as participant observations or interviews 
(cf. McNulty et al., 2013). These studies examine, for example, the role of power, trust, 
emotions and status in the boardroom (e.g. Bailey and Peck, 2013; Brundin and Nordqvist, 
2008; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). They demonstrate clear differences between major 
governance actors – for instance that chairs may influence decision-making processes by 
being assertive or using formal authority (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996), whereas non-
executives might achieve influence by building coalitions and using persuasion techniques 
(Pye and Camm, 2003; Samra-Fredericks, 2000a). An overarching theme of these studies, 
either explicit or implicit, is that relationships and interactions in the boardroom are important 
to board functioning. Thus, Huse and Zattoni (2008:73) assert that “there is a need to devote 
more attention to the internal processes of the board, such as interactions […]”. 
 
Exploring Board Meeting Interactions 
As board meetings represent the main arena where directors discharge their duties and make 
critical corporate decisions (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Lawler and Finegold, 2006), it is rather 
surprising how little research on meetings has advanced over time. When board meetings are 
discussed in any detail, it is often from a legal perspective and focused on providing guidelines 
that allow directors to meet their duties (Bhagat et al., 2008; Romano, 2005). Descriptions of 
board meetings appear remarkably consistent and share a basic pattern (Lorsch and McIver, 
1989; Leblanc and Gilles, 2005): (i) review of previous meetings; (ii) management reports on 
8 
 
past events; and (iii) discussion of future expectations and forecasts.  Moreover, prevailing 
norms prescribe standard board meeting routines like the circulation of information before the 
meeting, preparation of a detailed meeting agenda, and the Chair leading the discussion of 
agenda items (e.g. AICD, 2012; Baxt, 2009; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; NACD, 2012). 
  The treatment of board meetings as rather standardized routines is remarkable. First, 
scholars have recently documented important variations in the ways in which board meetings 
are run and directors participate. For example, Parker (2007a: 1454) highlights the “selective 
championing of strategies by directors” and their efforts in “navigating strategic initiatives 
through organizational politics”. Ocasio and Joseph (2005) signal that board routines (along 
with the topics on which boards focus) can vary markedly between organizations, where the 
micro processes and topics covered may reveal large differences between boards. Second, 
insights from small group research highlight the complex relationship between groups and 
outcomes (Hackman, 2002; Mathieu and Rapp, 2009; McGrath, 1991), challenging the notion 
that board processes and director actions in board meetings are consistent, stable and of equal 
importance to board level outcomes.  
 In light of these insights, this study provides a rigorous focus on board interactions, an 
understudied and potentially important element of the governance process. We thereby 
answer recent calls in the literature to investigate what happens during board meetings (Huse 
and Zattoni, 2008; Parker, 2007b; Pettigrew, 1992; Van Ees et al., 2009). In pursuing our 
objective, we adopt a research approach that recognizes the multi-level nature of board work 
(Aguinis et al., 2011; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Simsek et al., 2005) and use different levels 
of analysis concurrently. Moreover, in line with small groups research, we directly observe 
the structure of interactions between board members at an agenda item level, and seek to 
provide an explanation for different interaction patterns. It is with these possibilities in mind 
that we now turn to our empirical study, aimed at qualitatively exploring director interactions 
in the boardrooms of two Australian organizations. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Context 
Given our research objective to enhance our understanding of the inner dynamics of board 
meetings, we chose a case study method (Marshall and Rossman, 2010; Yin, 2003). This is 
an appropriate approach when inductively exploring new variables and the relationships 
between them (Currall et al., 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989). Given the limited prior research and 
the exploratory nature of our enquiry, we decided to intensively study multiple board meetings 
at two organizations. To simplify the already complex research context as much as possible, 
we followed homogenous sampling and recruited two relatively similar boards (Bono and 
McNamara, 2011; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). 
 During 2010 we identified two Australian public companies that were interested in 
participating in our research in return for feedback on the functioning of their boards. Both 
corporations were active in the same industry and were primarily reliant on delivery of both 
federal and state government funded contracts. The two companies had boards of similar size 
and in both cases the majority of directors were drawn from the membership and profession. 
This provided us an opportunity to more fully appraise the extent of variation in boardroom 
interactions in two relatively similar companies. 
 The Green corporation was a public, member based organization governed by a board 
of seven non-executive directors with a yearly turnover of approximately $4 M. Of the seven 
directors, four were drawn from the membership, one was a business professional, another 
one a partner with a professional services firm and the final one headed a state government 
instrumentality. There were no employee directors, but prior to the study Green had seconded 
its CEO to a strategic initiative in response to changing government funding policy. The CEO 
and Acting CEO both attended board meetings, as did a minute secretary.  
 The Red corporation was also a public, member based organization governed by a 
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board of eight nonexecutive directors with a yearly turnover of approximately $ 7 M. Five of 
the directors were drawn from the membership. The other three directors included a member 
with strong links to the community, a regional government member and a senior government 
employee. The CEO for Red attended all board meetings along with a minute secretary.  
 
Data Collection 
To obtain a comprehensive understanding of boardroom interactions we negotiated full-access 
to three board meetings and used the following data sources to triangulate our interpretations. 
First, we videotaped three meetings for each board with three small and discretely positioned 
video cameras. Each board also held a short pre-meeting without the cameras present and any 
director could ask to have the cameras turned off at any time (which did not happen). Trading 
off the potential impact our presence might have with the added value of experiencing board 
interactions real-life and being able to monitor our technical equipment, members of the 
research team also took field notes to document their fly-on-the-wall impressions during 
meetings. Meetings involved between six to ten people and lasted from 1.5 to 5.5 hours. 
While the video cameras prompted jocular comments in the early part of the first meeting, 
they seemed to become less invasive as time passed. Afterwards directors indicated that they 
did not have the impression that the cameras’ presence substantially affected their usual way 
of interacting with each other in the boardroom. 
 Second, during the board meetings directors and executives were asked to complete a 
mini-survey following the discussion of each agenda item. Given our focus on interactions, 
we asked them to rate the importance of an item, quality of discussion, their own engagement 
and satisfaction with the decision on a five-point Likert-scale. The mini-surveys particularly 
helped us to assess whether directors shared views on boardroom interactions and were used 
to purposefully select twelve agenda items that were used for a more in-depth analysis. 
 Third, we conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews throughout the observation 
11 
 
period, including several repeated interviews with the Chairs and CEOs of Green and Red. 
These interviews were focused on assessing the perceived functioning of the board, exploring 
director views on boardroom interactions and understanding the factors that might influence 
boardroom behaviours. Two researchers attended each interview and took notes, including 
word for word quotes. The notes were reviewed and synthesized following the interview. We 
deliberately decided not to tape these interviews to offer directors the opportunity to speak 
(more) openly about boardroom processes and the role of individual directors. 
 Fourth, the team collected a wide range of documents to build a profile of both boards 
and their board meeting routines. These documents included meeting agendas, board papers, 
minutes of previous meetings, annual reports, and other relevant strategy and policy docu-
ments. A summary of our data is provided in table 1.  
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Data Analysis 
Given the exploratory nature of our study, we broadly followed a four-stage iterative process 
to inductively analyse our data. First, we began with a review of all relevant documentary 
evidence to develop a short narrative for each board that provided insights into the way board 
meetings were arranged and run. In building the profiles, we were particularly interested in 
better understanding the environment of the organizations as well as the formal and informal 
power structures surrounding the governance of Green and Red. We supplemented this initial 
review with interview data. 
 Second, we next reviewed our initial observations on each board meeting to develop 
an understanding of the nature of each board’s dynamics and interactions. While watching the 
video tapes, members of the research team immediately noted the rather heterogeneous nature 
of boardroom interactions. Whereas some agenda item interactions could be best characterized 
12 
 
as long monologues, others involved multiple directors that quickly responded to each other’s 
comments. Moreover, while some directors spoke irregularly for a longer time, others more 
often interrupted the discussion by making short remarks. From this initial observation, we 
developed the idea to code directors’ contribution to agenda item discussions by volume (both 
in terms of length and number of contributions). 
 Third, having established a tentative theme for further investigation, we purposively 
sampled twelve agenda items for the more detailed analysis (two items from each board for 
each board meeting). Since each hour of video required approximately 20 hours of coding, 
purposive sampling of agenda items was chosen to balance resource constraints with an 
ability to inductively explore the spread of differences between interaction patterns observed 
in the boardrooms (Patton, 2002). We used the outcomes of the mini-surveys to select agenda 
items, based on either the type of item or director perceptions as to the quality of discussions 
(see table 2 for descriptions of the twelve selected items). Subsequently, each of these items 
was entered into specialist video coding software (i.e. Observer XT). Coding proceeded 
through a simple binary code for when each individual spoke. This allowed us to calculate the 
duration of time an individual spent talking, the number of times an individual spoke (turn 
taking), as well as who spoke after who during agenda item discussions. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
  
 Fourth, we re-examined our full data set to provide corroborating or disconfirming 
evidence for our conclusions. This proceeded with a detailed review of all interview notes as 
well as a review of board documents. Any discrepancies between the interpretations of 
members of the research team were resolved through intensive discussion and by going back 
and forth to the data. Finally, the conclusions of the study were presented at directors' events 
and academic conferences to triangulate our findings with the community at large. 
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RESULTS 
 
Board Meeting Similarities 
Our observation data of the six board meetings at Red and Green revealed that both boards of 
directors meet and interact similarly in several ways. First, Red and Green shared a number 
of structural elements that have been recommended by practitioners (e.g. Baxt, 2009; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003). Every meeting was well-prepared, with each board providing its members 
pre-circulated board agendas and papers. Each agenda also contained standard agenda items, 
such as the approval of the previous meeting minutes, committee reports and a CEO report. 
Furthermore, the Chair opened meetings and signalled changes in agenda items. Both boards 
also used an “action list” to monitor the implementation of board decisions. 
 Second, the interaction patterns of both boards displayed similarities. The CEOs and 
Chairs of Red and Green significantly participated in every board meeting, together speaking 
over 50% of the total meetings’ length. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, one single director 
tended to dominate discussion input (in terms of duration) into each item (i.e. nearly all items 
have an outlier) at both boards. This highlights that, irrespective of length of discussion for 
each agenda item, perceived discussion quality, or even in qualitatively different items, one 
single meeting participant appears to lead the discussion on each topic. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Intra-Board Differences 
Despite these surface-level similarities between board meetings at Red and Green, a closer 
examination of the interaction pattern revealed clear intra-board meeting differences. While 
one director led discussions for every agenda item (in terms of time spent talking over the 
total length of discussion), the individual leading the discussion changed for each item. 
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Interestingly, in both boards there were items where it was neither the Chair nor the CEO 
who was leading the discussion; for different items different individual directors provided the 
majority of input. This finding was borne out by our interview data; for instance we asked 
participants to identify individuals with the most influence on the board. Typical responses 
would be as follows: 
 
“...everyone plays a different role at different times on different topics...no one is overly 
dominating...” (Red, Director 5 – RD5) 
 
“...We’re all on an equal footing on the board.” (Green, Director 6 – GD6) 
 
 The differences between agenda items are clearly visible in the pattern of interactions 
observed during the meeting. Figures 2 and 3 provide diagrammatic representations of the 
interactions for each agenda item for Green and Red respectively. These were created using 
the SNA package in R (Butts, 2010). We constructed a social network diagram to represent 
the discussion of each agenda item. The size of each circle represents the relative time a 
director spent talking in each agenda item; the arrow weight represents the relative number of 
times that the director at the tail preceded the director at the head of the arrow. The resulting 
Markov chain-type diagram represents a stylized map of relative participation (time spent 
talking) and interaction (who followed who).  
 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 Both Figures 2 and 3 highlight the finding that despite a single person tending to 
dominate the duration of talk time (and appear as an outlier on the boxplot), there are radical 
differences in boardroom interactions between agenda items. For instance, in figure 2 (Green 
board) we can observe that the Chair plays different roles across the items. While in some 
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items the Chair leads the discussion (G2.1), in others the Chair shares a more balanced role 
with directors (G2.2 and G3.2) or indeed takes on a facilitative role with respect to another 
director (G3.1). Overall, there was no consistent pattern of the Chair (GCh) being in the 
centre of the communications network (for instance see the role of GD6 in item G1.1 and 
GD2 in item G1.2) nor evidence that they seem to dominate discussions. The same pattern 
held for other pivotal members of the meeting, such as the CEO (GCE). 
 Figure 3 corroborates these conclusions with evidence from Red. For different agenda 
items, different individuals played key roles (e.g. RCE in R2.2 versus RD3 in R1.2). Perhaps 
even more surprisingly, interview data cast the Chair of Red in a very positive light, yet the 
Chair does not appear to play a central role in discussions, either in terms of high levels of 
input or being central to the discussion on a regular basis (for an exception see R1.1 and the 
interplay between the Chair and the CEO). Similarly, for some agenda items (e.g. R2.2 and 
R3.2) the Chief Executive (RCE) plays a central and voluminous role in discussions; in 
others (e.g. R2.1 and R3.1) the role is clearly supportive. 
 In summary, at first glance the board meetings of both Red and Green appear similar. 
Yet, a deeper investigation of the meetings reveals significant differences at the agenda item 
level. Despite some consistencies (e.g. one individual speaking for the majority of time for 
most items), there were important intra-board differences in the way directors contribute and 
participate to the discussion.  
 
Inter-Board Differences 
Whereas several intra-board differences were present in both cases, the interactions across the 
two boards also varied. A key pattern of difference, not immediately evident from what we 
have presented thus far, was the difference in turn taking that occurred in the two boards. 
Turn taking is a proxy for participation of each director during the discussion and in Figure 4 
this data is presented for both boards. As shown, the two boards provide a striking contrast in 
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terms of turn taking behaviour. In the case of Green, four of the six items (G1.1, G2.1. G2.2 
and G3.1) contain turn taking outlier(s). In the case of Red, only one item (R3.2) showed a 
turn taking outlier. The mean and quartile cut offs for Red are also noticeably broader 
(indicating a greater range of participation) than across the comparably selected items in 
Green. This indicates that there is a qualitative difference in the interaction occurring between 
the boards.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Our interview data revealed that the directors of Green reported a different experience of their 
board meetings compared to Red. Several Green board members reported that they thought 
board meetings might provide greater opportunities to participate. Typical comments 
highlighted a sense of wanting to participate more in discussions: 
 
“The board meetings are more like an info session rather than a decision frame… 
[there could be better] discussion about things.” (Green, Acting CEO- GCE) 
 
In contrast, the board members of Red commented that they were generally content with the 
opportunity to participate in boardroom interactions, although a minority of participants felt 
that sometimes discussions could drag on a little long: 
 
There is a [good] balance between free flow of thoughts and need to stick to time.” 
(Red, Director 6 – RD6)  
 
Studying Agenda Item Interactions 
Our observations highlight the complexity of the board’s work and the need to take the 
nestedness of board interactions seriously (see also Dalton and Dalton, 2011). Particularly, 
our data hint at explanations at multiple levels of analysis that might help to better understand 
why certain agenda item interactions differ from other ones. 
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 First, at an agenda item-level, factors such as the content of an item (i.e. operational 
versus strategic), frequency (routine versus non-routine), stage in the decision-making process 
(for noting versus decision required) and importance might have an impact on interactions. In 
our specific cases, for example, we noted that several last-minute strategic developments had 
an unexpected impact on specific agenda item interactions, resulting in less-focused discussions 
in which more directors participated.  
 Second, at a meeting-level, rather innocuous factors such as the timing and meeting 
place might have an impact on agenda item interactions. For example, the average agenda 
item length for Green was shorter than for Red (22m45s versus 16m30s minutes), possibly 
explaining why directors of Green more often highlighted that they would have liked more 
opportunities to contribute. Furthermore, one of our boards discussed a difficult situation 
before one of their meetings, which in our view had a clear influence on the (in)activeness of 
certain participants during that specific board meeting.  
Third, at a director-level, the interests, expertise and (group) skills of individuals also 
appear to have a significant impact on their participation in agenda-item discussions. Our 
observations suggest that it is not only the human and social capital that directors bring to the 
board, but also their structural position on the board that affects their role. In our cases, for 
instance, domination of interactions by a director other than the chair often appeared to be the 
result of a delegated responsibility (i.e. chair of a committee or a director being in charge of a 
special initiative). 
 Fourth, at a board-level, the board meeting arrangements appear to have an influence 
on boardroom interactions. Whereas Green and Red met the same number of times during our 
observation period, Green met on weekdays for 2 hours, whereas Red met at the weekend for 
a full day. Potentially, this might have resulted in more time pressure for Green’s board and 
less opportunities for directors to participate. Furthermore, a difference in tenure between both 
boards (i.e. Green had two newly appointed directors) may have affected the contributions of 
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individual directors. 
 Fifth, at an organizational-level, multiple factors might affect the boardroom culture. 
In this case, Green’s board faced a rapid environmental disruption that significantly challenged 
the board and might have put more pressure on their interactions. Whereas this factor may 
have had a direct impact on director interactions, it is also possible that it indirectly affected 
the factors discussed before. For example, the environmental threat might have focused the 
board’s attention on certain topics, not allowing for enough discussion time for others. 
 In conclusion, while our study has confirmed the presence of meeting similarities, our 
board observations primarily showed significant intra- and inter-board meeting differences, 
challenging the notion of board meetings as monolithic. While the complexity surrounding 
meetings makes it difficult to pinpoint exact explanations, our data reveal how several factors 
at multiple levels of analysis might help scholars and practitioners to better understand 
qualitatively different boardroom interactions (see Table 3 for an overview). 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
We commenced this paper by noting that board meetings are a key feature of the governance 
process, yet, despite their importance, little empirical research exists on how boards are run, 
how directors contribute to discussion and how interactions occur (Carter and Lorsch, 2004; 
Charan, 2005; He and Huang, 2011). To that end, we conducted an in-depth and systematic 
observation of two boards as they went about their work to try and shed some light from 
inside the black box of the boardroom. Our observation confirms some of the existing beliefs 
around board meetings as well as providing new insights. The two boards showed similarities 
in the way meetings are run, the circulation of information, the role and function of the Chair, 
and consistency in dealing with guidelines and compliance with regulation. At a deeper level, 
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however, board meetings appear different in many respects, i.e. we observed a great variance 
in interaction, contribution and discussion between the different agenda items. 
 These results have several research implications. First, we selected the agenda item as 
a unit of analysis. This is a striking difference compared to existing literature that tends to 
focus on the overall role or task execution of boards (Huse, 2007), that is, whether they should 
focus on monitoring, advice or both (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). Studying agenda items and decisions is in line with an attention based view of the firm 
advanced by Ocasio (1997) in that it reflects the actual position whereby boards and their 
members must limit their focus of attention to a limited number of items as a consequence of 
limited time and directors’ bounded rationality. Given the pivotal role of the board in the 
governance of corporations, studying these micro-interactions and contributions might be 
helpful in understanding the different paths that firms follow and how ‘coalitions of directors’ 
might come to dominate certain decisions. It might, for example, be interesting to investigate 
whether recurrent patterns exist when CEOs or Chairs dominate boards or study possible 
interventions of outside directors and how these actions may shape decision outcomes. 
 Second, by documenting significant intra- and inter-board meeting differences our 
study challenges the notion of board meetings as rather homogeneous, monolithic and 
straightforward. In contrast, board meetings are dynamic where the participation and 
contributions of individual directors vary by agenda item. Our study provides evidence that 
characterising boards as passive or active (Brown, 2005), strategic or operational (Golden and 
Zajac, 2001) or on the myriad of other possible dimensions may not provide the nuance 
required to understand a board’s effectiveness. If, as our data suggest, director participation 
and contribution changes with each agenda item, then the salience of a particular agenda item 
to the individuals may affect how they act; if they are familiar with a topic, they may be 
active rather than passive; strategic rather than operational or even more innovative and 
entrepreneurial. As a corollary, our results also suggest that demographic studies are unlikely 
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to prove fruitful unless they (i) incorporate social processes and individual contributions 
and/or (ii) focus on specific, critical board decisions in which group processes are relatively 
stable. 
 Third, our exploration of differences in interaction patterns across agenda items, and 
boards revealed multi-level complexities within board meetings. Whereas previous studies 
often use single shot measures with a limited number of informants, this study demonstrates 
the value of using multiple measures across various agenda items and meetings along with 
the involvement of all board members. Applying multi-level techniques in this complex 
context is a potentially fruitful approach for future studies as it overcomes a common 
limitation in board research (see Cronin et al., 2011; Dalton and Dalton, 2011) by highlighting 
how factors at multiple levels are likely to combine to impact board effectiveness. On the 
basis of our observations we tentatively generated an overview of factors at multiple levels of 
analysis to guide such future endeavours (see Table 3).  
 
Implications for Practice 
Our study also has implications for practice. First, the micro-level differences shaping a 
board’s interaction pattern highlights the need for more tailored approaches to board 
prescriptions. Whereas regulators often focus on the “right” board structures and procedures 
in a one-size-fits-all manner, our study brings to light the complexities involved in board 
decision-making. Given the limited differences in the board’s surface level approaches to 
board structures (e.g. similar agenda structures, paper preparation and so on) and meetings, it 
is clear that other more subtle issues have a significant impact on board outcomes. 
 Second, we see implications for boards of directors themselves. While boards are 
provided with different guidelines, codes of good conduct and formulaic suggestions to 
improve effectiveness, these prescriptions may overlook the importance of increasing board 
member participation and contribution. For example, our results indicated that evenness in 
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turn taking (i.e. balanced contributions by directors) appears to lead to qualitatively different 
interaction perceptions, corroborating recent research from the general human behaviour 
literature that is linking turn taking with positive group performance (Pentland, 2008; 
Woolley et al., 2010). As such, this finding tentatively hints at one of the main differences in 
boards’ effectiveness that might deserve more attention in board evaluations: the ability of 
the group to work together. 
  
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The study suffers from some limitations, but also provides avenues for future research. First, 
our focus of attention has largely been on understanding two dimensions of interactions in the 
boardroom, i.e. duration of contributions and turn taking behaviour. While our qualitative 
data corroborate the significance of both measures, we did not directly investigate other 
elements of interaction such as the content and quality of directors’ contributions, way of 
expressing their arguments (Samra-Fredericks, 2000a; 2000b) and nonverbal behaviours 
(Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008). Future studies could complement our approach by including 
these interaction aspects and we highly recommend the use of video cameras, as it enables 
researchers to return to the data and validate observations in a rigorous fashion.  
 Second, while our study tentatively highlighted a finding that various levels of analysis 
interact, we have not applied multilevel techniques to comprehensively model and control for 
the nested nature of our data. Further studies could, for example, use multilevel techniques to 
examine how the general set-up of meetings shapes the treatment of individual agenda items, 
thereby shedding light on tactics to influence decision-making (e.g. Parker, 2008). 
 Third, our choice to study two comparable corporations in Australia enabled us to 
control for environmental differences. Yet, our findings may not be generalizable across other 
times and contexts. In our cases, we note the particularly turbulent environment facing the 
companies that resulted in a highly challenging context for both boards. Moreover, previous 
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research has highlighted the finding that a board’s contributions vary along the life-cycle of a 
firm (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009; Huse and Zattoni, 2008), adding a temporal dimension to a 
board’s task performance (cf. Machold and Farquhar, 2013). As the observed interaction 
pattern may be a direct result of firm or setting specificities, further replication studies are 
necessary to gauge the generalizability of our findings.  
 
Conclusion 
There are striking differences between what is often written about board meetings and what 
emerged from our direct observation. Currently, board meetings tend to be treated as rather 
monolithic and uniform, i.e., there are guidelines, best practices, laws and duties which boards 
have to deal with; but in fact we still do not know much in terms of what happens in the 
boardroom (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). Our findings indicate that board operations are far 
more nuanced than expected. By directly observing differences in discussion patterns at an 
agenda item level, we have been able to highlight the reality that board meeting activities 
which appear homogeneous to outsiders (e.g. similar agendas, similar minutes) are strikingly 
different. These differences occur even within the same board during the same meeting with 
board members appearing to transition between behaviours in the group as required by the 
task. As such, our work complements existing behavioural studies of corporate governance 
by providing an in-depth analysis of what boards do in their meetings. We hope that while 
presenting a challenging research agenda, future work can build on this foundation to discern 
the patterns of interaction associated with effective boards.   
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Table 1: Data sources for two case studies 
Data Type Detail Rationale 
Board observations 
Videotaped each board for 3 meetings using 3 cameras: 
- Red: meeting 1 (Nov 2010; 4h20m), meeting 2 (Feb 2011; 4h20m), 
meeting 3 (Apr 2011; 5h25m) 
- Green: meeting 1 (Nov 2010; 1h30m), meeting 2 (Feb 2011; 2h30m), 
meeting 3 (March 2011; 2h15m)  
Wanted to directly observe the patterns (if any) of board 
interactions. 
Director interviews Semi-structured interviews of directors (12) and managers (3) Used to establish perceptions of directors on dynamics and, in some cases, test our emerging themes. 
Board documentation Reviewed board papers, agenda, minutes, reports, committee papers Used to compare with observations and to provide further understanding of board processes and context. 
Publicly available 
information 
Reviewed annual reports, web sites and other publicly available 
information (e.g. industry news, newsletters, government updates, etc.) 
Used to develop a broad understanding of each company, its 
board and the challenges facing it.  
Mini-surveys 
Each director and officer was asked to complete an assessment  (on a 5-
point scale) of each agenda item after the discussion; a total of 345 
surveys were completed. 
Used to identify possible impacts for our observations (e.g. 
perceptions of item importance and quality of discussion); used 
to select agenda items for detailed analysis. 
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Table 2: Items analyzed with intensive coding 
Code Board Meeting Item Rationale Duration* Absences**/ 
Present on phone
Importance*** Quality 
discuss***. 
R1.1 Red 1 Election of office bearers Routine or programmatic issue covered by both boards 10m 15s 
RD1, RD6 
Phone: RD4 
4.33  
(.82) 
3.20 
(1.10) 
G1.1 Green 1 Board committee membership 
Routine or programmatic issue 
covered by both boards 14m 15s None 
3.89  
(.78) 
3.44 
(.53) 
R1.2 Red 1 Committee report Report to board on key area 29m 30s RD1, RD6, RD4 5.00 (0.00) 
4.50 
(.55) 
G1.2 Green 1 Special initiative report Report to board on key area 15m 30s None 4.55 (0.53) 
3.33 
(.71) 
R2.1 Red 2 Request for letter of support Lowest rated in perceived quality of discussion 11m 30s 
RD6, RCh, RD4 
Phone: RD3 
4.67 
(.58) 
3.50 
(.58) 
G2.1 Green 2 Board calendar Lowest rated in perceived quality of discussion 12m 30s 
GCE 
Phone: GD2 
3.43 
(.98) 
3.57 
(.79) 
R2.2 Red 2 Draft strategic plan Highest rated in perceived quality of discussion 15m 30s RD3, RD4 
4.50 
(.53) 
4.00 
(.89) 
G2.2 Green 2 Special initiative update Highest rated in perceived quality of discussion 21m 00s GD2 
4.63 
(.52) 
4.00 
(.00) 
R3.1 Red 3 Discussion: appointment of new Director 
Lowest deviation in quality of 
quality of discussion 36m 30s RD4, RD5 
4.71 
(.49) 
4.86 
(.38) 
G3.1 Green 3 Office equipment contract Lowest deviation in quality of discussion 08m 45s 
GD5 
Phone: GD3 
4.29 
(.76) 
4.14 
(.38) 
R3.2 Red 3 Major strategy decisions Highest deviation in quality of discussion 33m 00s RD4, RD5 
3.83 
(.75) 
3.50 
(1.05) 
G3.2 Green 3 Staff employment contracts Highest deviation in quality of discussion 26m 00s 
GD5 
Phone: GD3 
4.57 
(.53) 
3.14 
(.69) 
*To nearest 15 sec. ** Code of individual absent or on phone for that item. *** Scores represent the avg value of directors’ assessment of each item after the discussion.
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Figure 1: Boxplot of time spent speaking in each agenda item by directors* 
 
*Each bar represents a different agenda item, with the circles representing outliers in terms of the proportion of time they spent speaking during that agenda item.  
   
32 
 
Figure 2: Social network representation of Green’s boardroom interactions* 
*These six diagrams represent the six detailed codings for the Green Board meetings. Each participant is marked on the diagram. The size of the 
circle represents the proportional time that person spent talking during the item. The weight of the arrow between participants represents the number 
of times the person at the head of the arrow followed the person at the tail of the arrow. The participants are coded, and the Chair is coloured red, the 
Chief Executive is coloured orange, other executives are coloured yellow, the minute secretary blue and directors are green. Directors not 
participating are represented by an unlinked X. 
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Figure 3: Social network representation of Red’s boardroom interactions* 
*These six diagrams represent the six detailed codings for the Red Board meetings. Each participant is marked on the diagram. The size of the circle 
represents the proportional time that person spent talking during the item. The weight of the arrow between participants represents the number of 
times the person at the head of the arrow followed the person at the tail of the arrow. The participants are coded, and the Chair is coloured red, the 
Chief Executive is coloured orange, other executives are coloured yellow, the minute secretary blue and directors are green. Directors not 
participating are represented by an unlinked X.  
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Figure 4: Boxplot of turn taking in each agenda item by directors* 
 
* Each bar represents a different agenda item, with the circles representing outliers in terms of the proportion of turn taking during that agenda item. 
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Table 3: Multi-level factors possible contributing to different interaction patterns 
Level of analysis Theme Examples of factors 
Organization - Legal status 
- Firm characteristics 
- Industry 
- Environment 
- National context 
Profit versus non-profit; listed versus unlisted 
Organizational age; organizational size 
Blue-collar versus white-collar;  
Uncertainty; complexity; turbulence 
Shareholder-focus versus stakeholder focus; common-law versus civil-law 
Board of directors 
(as a group) 
- Meeting routines 
- Boardroom culture 
- Balance of power 
- Boardroom norms 
Structure of agenda; papers; role of the chair 
Open versus closed; active versus passive; risk-taking versus risk-averse 
CEO-dominated versus board-dominated 
Strong versus weak group norms; shared identity or not 
Meeting - Logistics 
- Participants 
- Unexpected events 
Timing; place; length; number of issues to discuss 
Invitees; absent directors; members phoning in 
Personal clashes; unexpected high-impact issue emerging right before a  meeting 
Board members 
(individuals) 
- Human capital 
- Social capital 
- Structural position 
- Personality 
- Motivation 
Expertise and skills, e.g. financial versus non-financial knowledge, CEO-experience or not 
Other (board) positions and connections, e.g. government connections, banking relations 
Chair versus non-Chair; board committee member or not 
Introvert versus extravert; openness to experience; conscientiousness 
Self-interests; independence; board tenure 
Agenda Item - Content  
- Importance 
- Timing  
- Decision-making stage 
- Recurrent nature 
Strategic versus operational; monitoring-related versus service-related 
High-impact versus low-impact 
Early versus late during meetings; before or after high-impact decision 
Initiation or implementation versus ratification or monitoring 
Routine versus non-routine; discussed before versus new issue 
 
